The lyrics of Genesis’ 1986 hit “Land of Confusion” were penned over 30 years ago, with the English rock band satirising Ronald Reagan’s US presidency (see Figure 1). Specifically, they allude to the confusion fuelled by opportunist politicians in a fast-changing world beset by acute challenges. But, in my view, they portray with uncanny accuracy the UK in 2017 as Prime Minister Theresa May and her government, Parliament and the Bank of England feel their way towards Brexit. Read more
Category Archives: UK Economics
With the votes having been counted for 649 of the 650-seats in the House of Commons, the ruling Conservatives have 318 seats, a net loss of 12 seats. Labour, the main opposition party, won 261 (+32).
Even if the Conservatives win the 650th seat, they will at best be 7 seats short of an absolute majority and 5 seats short of a working majority – a hung parliament.
Prime Minister Theresa May announced that the Conservatives would form an informal alliance with the Northern Irish DUP which won 10 seats. The DUP would support the Conservatives in key votes, likely in exchange for some say on government policy.
Theresa May’s future seems secure for now but medium-term I would expect her position to come under close scrutiny and a party-leadership battle remains a distinct possibility.
Sterling has weakened about 1.5% post election, in line with my and market expectations. The Conservatives’ loss of seats raises serious questions about Theresa May’s leadership, her decision to trigger early elections and the risk of a party leadership battle to oust her.
Moreover, markets will likely remain concerned about the shelf-life of a Conservative-DUP alliance and its ability to push legislation through parliament.
However, I also see scope for Sterling’s downturn to fade and even reverse in due course. To be clear, a V-shaped Sterling recovery would likely remain elusive.
Two key questions pertain to the likelihood of this new Conservative-DUP formal alliance 1) securing an advantageous EU deal and 2) opting for a “hard” or “soft” version of Brexit.
If anything, the past two months have reinforced my view that the government is ill-equipped, ill-prepared and lacking in institutional capacity to negotiate complex deals with the EU and non-EU partners.
The composition of parliament and its take on Brexit leave Theresa May in somewhat of a bind. The government may therefore have little choice but to seek support from some of the 322 opposition MPs who on the whole favour the UK remaining in the EU or at the very least a “soft” version of Brexit.
So while I do not expect a second referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU, I do see a possibility of the government toning down its rhetoric and potentially opting for a softer version of Brexit – a development which UK financial markets would welcome in my view.
At the very least, this election has further weakened the idea that nationalist parties in Europe are gaining the upper hand.
In less than 24 hours the British electorate will start voting in the election for the 650-seat House of Commons with the result expected early in the morning of Friday 9th June.
While the last general election was only held two years ago, there is arguably as much if not more at stake this time round than in May 2015.
Opinion polls still point to the ruling Conservatives winning a record-high 44% of the national vote ahead of the opposition Labour Party, but polling agencies which in the past have misestimated true voting intentions still display great inconsistency.
Ultimately it is the number of seats which British parties command which matters and the UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system makes it difficult to predict.
You Gov’s constituency-specific model forecasts the Conservatives winning only 304 seats as a result of a record number of “wasted” votes, a 26-seat loss and well short of both a working and absolute majority. Labour would increase its seat numbers from 229 to 266.
This would result in a hung parliament and either a coalition or minority government.
My own model points to the Conservatives winning around 360 seats (55.4% of total) and Labour 212 seats. Admittedly, this prediction is based on a number of assumptions, namely the net share of votes which Conservatives gain from other parties as well as voter turnout.
Whether the Conservatives significantly improve on their current 330 seats or fail to secure a parliamentary majority remains a tough call and there is an almost infinite number of possible outcomes.
However, I have narrowed down in Figure 10 the number of seats the Conservatives could win to eight possible scenarios, in each case assessing i) Their probability; ii) Their numerical impact on the Conservatives’ majority (or lack thereof); and iii) The risk of opposition parties and/or Conservative backbenchers high-jacking the policy agenda.
Figure 11 assesses for each of the eight scenarios their likely impact on iv) Theresa May’s standing within the Conservative Party and v) Sterling and currency volatility.
Regardless of what happens tomorrow, two events beyond British shores also scheduled for 8th June – the ECB’s policy meeting and Former FBI Director James Comey’s testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee – will conceivably exacerbate Sterling volatility.
UK retail sales in Q1 likely contracted from Q4 2016, despite their rebound in February.
Falling real wages and slowing household borrowing are likely to further dampen retail sales and consumption growth going forward.
The still large pool of available workers is seemingly limiting their wage-bargaining power, with nominal wage growth falling behind rising inflation.
Moreover, investment growth is still only making a negligible contribution to GDP growth ahead of the British government’s decision to trigger Article 50 on 29th March.
Much of the rise in inflation in recent months is attributable to imported inflation driven by Sterling’s depreciation since November 2015 with little evidence of demand-led inflation.
This situation is reminiscent of 2007-2008 when Sterling’s collapse fuelled imported and in turn headline inflation.
Should Sterling remain broadly unchanged going forward, its year-on-year pace of depreciation, currently around 9%, would slow from June onwards and hit zero towards end-year according to my estimates, in turn dampening imported inflation.
I would expect retailers to stabilise prices to maintain market share in the face of tepid demand and for wage-inflation expectations to remain modest. This was certainly the case in the 12 months to September 2009 with CPI-inflation falling from 5.2% yoy to 1.1% yoy.
The question is whether the BoE is willing to look beyond a potentially temporary rise in UK inflation – as Governor Mark Carney suggested – or whether it tries to short-circuit any self-reinforcing rise in prices.
My base-line scenario is that the BoE will look beyond the current rise in UK inflation, unless at least one of three conditions materialise:
(1) Nominal wage growth accelerates, comfortably outstripping headline inflation and driving consumption growth;
(2) Commercial bank lending picks up significantly; and
(3) Sterling depreciates materially from current levels, exacerbating imported and in turn headline inflation.
I expect that neither (1) or (2) will materialise any time soon and that while risks to Sterling are probably to the downside, Sterling is unlikely to weaken sufficiently to push the BoE into hiking. I would however expect it to keep a possible rate hike firmly on the table. Read more
Reports in the British press about the content of Theresa May’s planned speech tomorrow seem to confirm that the prime minister may sacrifice access to the Single Market in exchange for control over EU immigration into the UK.
Unsurprisingly perhaps, Sterling has weakened further but the currency may get some (temporary) respite if the content of Theresa May’s actual speech is somewhat more conciliatory.
In particular I would expect markets to focus on whether the UK government has moved closer to agreeing to a transitional arrangement once the UK has actually left the EU and whether any progress has been made in protecting the all-important UK services sector.
About 45% of the UK’s total exports are destined to the other 27 EU member states and about 53% of its total imports come from the EU. In comparison, only about 9% of the EU-27 exports of goods and services are destined for the UK. Similarly, only 9% of the EU-27 imports of goods and services come from the UK.
The EU thus has far more leverage over the UK than vice-versa assuming these 27 EU member states are willing and able to negotiate as one trading block, in my view. This imbalance is even greater in traded goods alone.
However, when it comes to services, the picture is somewhat more balanced and the UK may arguably have a stronger bargaining hand.
Simply put the EU buys and sells a far greater share of its services to/from the UK than it does for goods and it may be difficult for EU countries to substitute imports of financial services from the UK given London’s pre-eminence as a financial centre. Read more
British Prime Minister Theresa May will make a speech on Tuesday 17th January in which she will set out in greater details her plans for the UK’s exit from the EU.
There have been few signs that she is willing to tone down her mantra of the UK regaining control over immigration in exchange for a bespoke trading deal with the EU which may exclude access to the Single Market.
If Theresa May sticks to her guns next week I would expect Sterling to weaken further.
A sell-off in Sterling could be partly curbed if Prime Minister May agrees more explicitly to a transition agreement whereby the UK still retains some of the benefits of EU membership even after the UK has officially left the EU.
If MPs perceive Theresa May’s speech as insufficiently detailed or it is not backed up with a detailed and formal government white paper, parliament may decide to delay or even scupper the process by which Article 50 is triggered.
This would at the margin increase the perceived odds of the UK remaining in the EU and may provide some relief for Sterling.
However, I would view this as only a temporary reprieve as ultimately the government has a popular mandate for the UK to leave the EU.
The apparent resilience of British economic growth since the June referendum has given weight to the arguments that the economy can easily weather the UK’s exit from the EU and that the British government is in a strong negotiating position.
However, the risk now is perhaps that too much confidence is being placed in the British economy’s ability to weather a number of possible forthcoming challenges. Read more
There are multiple factors behind Sterling’s collapse in the past fortnight to decade lows and the question remains whether these factors will reverse any time soon.
At the top of the pyramid of causes for Sterling’s demise, in my view, is not the UK’s large current account deficit or Bank of England (BoE) policy but the stance on EU membership which Prime Minister Theresa May has adopted.
So while Sterling’s greater competitiveness may eventually drive FX inflows into the UK and help Sterling to recover, financial markets and investors are likely to continue to take their cue from the British government near-term.
Simply put, if Theresa May continues down of the path of “Hard Brexit”, however ill-defined, Sterling is likely to remain under pressure.
However, history shows that while EU leaders have a tendency to drag their feet over key issues, they are able and willing to eventually find some kind of compromise.
Moreover, Theresa May will be subject to the will of her own Conservative Party – which on the whole supports membership of the UK or at least a softer form of exit from the EU – and of the people.
While the BoE would prefer a more stable currency and lower yields, there is probably little than it can (or should) do near-term beyond trying to reassure markets, investors and households. Read more
Sterling’s collapse overnight has eclipsed somewhat tepid US labour market data.
The net result is that the Sterling NEER has weakened a further 2% since yesterday and is now down about 20% since November 2015.
While trading desks will have a far better grasp of how risk management systems and liquidity contributed to sterling’s drop, recent political decisions and UK data clearly helped set the scene and will leave the currency vulnerable going forward.
Theresa May’s government and EU leaders have in recent weeks successively dismantled the raft of hopeful predictions which had helped Sterling stabilise over the summer.
Moreover, there is growing evidence that a more competitive Sterling has not translated into materially stronger UK industrial output or exports, with the UK’s trade deficit in goods and services widening in recent months
I would reiterate my view, expressed in early July, that the uncertainty associated with the UK’s possible exit from the EU will likely continue to weigh on the UK economy and currency.
This week’s fall in sterling, if anything, has reinforced my view that the Bank of England will maintain a dovish rhetoric but for now refrain from cutting its policy rate to zero or expanding its current QE program.
Moreover I would not expect the BoE to intervene in the FX market to support sterling at this stage. Read more
We may well never know the true extent of the impact of the EU referendum outcome on the British economy, markets and ultimately standards of living. This may not be the most satisfying conclusion, but this uncertainty is one which policy-makers will have to grapple with.
As to the bigger question of whether the UK is better off today or will be better off in years to come when one takes into account not only the impact on the economy but also broader, less tangible issues such as sovereignty, the answer is and will likely remain even more subjective.
In any case, available data paint a patchy picture of the UK economy post-referendum. Construction and services have been harder hit than manufacturing. Retail sales were strong in July thanks in part to a robust labour market and plentiful lending. While this defies the collapse in consumer confidence temporary factors may also have been at play.
The residential property market at a national level has been softer but resilient post referendum. Mortgage lending remains depressed but government policies are for now more likely to blame. The commercial property market has been harder hit.
Sterling’s 10% collapse since the referendum, following a 10% depreciation between November and June, is seemingly supporting economic growth and demand for UK assets even if history suggests that it is no panacea. Its inflationary impact has so far been very modest but the risk is a squeeze on profit margins and real wages.
At the same time sterling’s collapse has tangibly eroded the UK’s net wealth, at least when expressed in foreign-currency terms – a fact largely ignored by policy-makers and the media.
I would expect the BoE to continue favouring monetary and credit policies which explicitly help spur lending, spending and investment and, implicitly at least, help cap sterling. While this may not translate into another policy rate cut or round of QE near-term, the BoE is likely to keep this option firmly on the table if the UK economy fails to return to trend in the next six months.
For the past few years, the Bank of England’s MPC meetings have been pretty straightforward affairs, with the policy rate firmly on hold at its record low of 0.5%.
But the referendum result has dramatically changed the British political landscape and amplified the uncertainty over the near and long-term outlook for the UK economy.
A 25bp rate cut today is perhaps not quite the foregone conclusion which markets are almost fully pricing in. The BoE could today make valid arguments both to support a 25bp rate cut and no change.
On balance, however, I think the BoE has more compelling reasons to cut its policy rate 25bp today than to leave it on hold.
First, BoE Governor Carney has made clear that a rate cut was potentially on the cards, making it harder for him to backtrack.
Second, the British economy was showing clear signs of weakness even before the referendum.
Third, there are signs that economic and political uncertainty post referendum are already having a negative impact on consumption, investment and confidence.
Finally, the BoE may be the only game in town for now as there is limited room for domestic fiscal policy and global monetary policy reflation.
But cutting the policy rate to 25bp or even zero is clearly no panacea to the challenges which the UK faces in coming weeks, months and perhaps even years and there are valid counter-arguments as to why the BoE may leave its policy rate on hold today.
These include that the BoE should save its (limited) bullets and wait for more hard data, a BoE rate cut would set in motion self-fulfilling prophecy, the BoE should balance post-referendum chaos with a steady policy rate, the global equity market rebound has removed the sense of urgency and a rate cut could trigger uncontrolled Sterling depreciation.
Regardless of today’s decision, the BoE’s accompanying minutes will likely try to capture this new paradigm.
A rate cut today would still leave the BoE the option of cutting rates again at its 4th August meeting but negative interest rate policy and/or quantitative easing are still likely to be measures of last resort. Read more